

The Architecture of Disinformation in the Digital Environment: A Case Study of the Baltic Region and the Role of Public Institutions

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“It is better to have no information at all than to be misinformed, because misinformation constitutes negative information—information that is less than zero.”.



**~ Stanisław Lem
“Tales of Pirx the Pilot”**



Disinformation – What Is Worth Knowing at the Outset?

It constitutes a specific type of information.

It is a dynamic and constantly evolving phenomenon.

The development of digital technologies has increased the scale and speed of its impact.

Today, it constitutes one of the key elements of information warfare.

Information is no longer merely a resource; it has become a tool of influence.

Defining Disinformation

Disinformation is a multidimensional concept that is difficult to define unambiguously.

Its understanding depends on the research perspective adopted and the context of analysis.

Definitions differ, among other things, depending on:

- a) offensive or defensive applications,
- b) the type of information environment,
- c) the specific characteristics of a given sector or field of activity,
- d) the type and function of information.



According to Vladimir Volkoff

According to Vladimir Volkoff, disinformation constitutes a deliberate and long-term influence on the consciousness of recipients.

Its objective is to replace views considered undesirable with those desired by the disinformers.

Its influence extends to both the conscious and subconscious levels of the recipients.

This process leads to the shaping of social perceptions and social attitudes.

In this perspective, disinformation is not merely false information. It is a process of social influence.

According to Marek Świerczek

Disinformation is understood as an exceptionally complex method of operational activity, serving as a means of influencing a current or potential adversary, a hostile intelligence service, or specific social groups in another country, and sometimes also within one's own country.

In this perspective, disinformation is regarded as a powerful weapon worth possessing.

Institutional Approach

Contemporary analyses of disinformation extend beyond the academic perspective to include institutional and strategic dimensions.

International organizations and state institutions perceive it as a significant threat to information security and social stability.



Ministry of Digital Affairs (Poland) NASK – National Research Institute

Dezinformacja - co warto wiedzieć?

Wiedza o dezinformacji pomaga odbiorcy w jej rozpoznaniu, a co za tym idzie – powstrzymuje go od jej dalszego rozpowszechniania. Dlatego jest najlepszym sposobem walki z tym zjawiskiem. Warto wiedzieć, że:

- Dezinformacja to **nieprawdziwa lub celowo wprowadzająca w błąd informacja**, która jest tworzona i rozpowszechniana z zamiarem oszukania odbiorców.
- Dezinformacja to zamierzone działanie, które zaburza lub fałszuje przekaz informacyjny dla osiągnięcia określonych korzyści, np. ekonomicznych czy politycznych.
- Rozpowszechnianie dezinformacji jest to **szereg zaplanowanych czynności**, systematycznie i fachowo prowadzonych głównie za pośrednictwem mediów masowych (internetu, telewizji, prasy czy radia).
- Dziś dezinformacja **rozprzestrzenia się głównie w internecie i za pośrednictwem mediów społecznościowych**.
- Dezinformacja **może wyrządzić szkodę** zarówno jednostkom, grupom, organizacjom, jak i państwu.



Chroń się przed dezinformacją

Jak rozpoznać dezinformację i chronić się przed manipulacją? Odkryj techniki i mechanizmy związane z rozpowszechnianiem fałszywych treści z pomocą ekspertów z Ośrodka Analizy Dezinformacji Instytutu NASK.

[Widzisz dezinformację? Zgłoś ją!](#)



Definicje

Co zakłóca przepływ informacji?

Poznaj trzy kluczowe rodzaje zakłóceń w komunikacji: dezinformację, misinformację i malinformację.

Misinformacja

Treści nieprawdziwe, tworzone i rozpowszechniane bez intencji wyrządzenia szkody. Mogą powstawać w wyniku błędu lub braku rzetelności.

Dezinformacja

Fałszywe, niedokładne lub wprowadzające w błąd treści, które są zaprojektowane, prezentowane i promowane w celu umyślnego wyrządzenia szkody publicznej lub osiągnięcia zysku.

Malinformacja


Treści prawdziwe, wykorzystywane w sposób szkodliwy lub złośliwy, w celu wyrządzenia krzywdy. Mogą być związane np. z upublicznianiem informacji prywatnych.

European Union

Rośnie zagrożenie dla demokracji w Europie

Dezinformacja niepokoi Europejczyków:

Najważniejsze działania



Budowanie odporności demokracji
Promujemy wolne i uczciwe wybory,

83%

ludzi

uważa, że dezinformacja
zagroza demokracji

63%

młodych Europejczyków

natrafia na fake newsy częściej
niż raz w tygodniu

51%

Europejczyków

uważa, że padło ofiarą
dezinformacji online



Dezinformacja szkodzi naszemu społeczeństwu:

- podważa zaufanie do instytucji i mediów
 - zagraża demokratycznym wyborom
 - ogranicza zdolność obywateli do podejmowania świadomych decyzji
- ... i skuteczności wypowiedzi.

Walka UE z dezinformacją – kalendarium

marzec 2015 r.



W Europejskiej Służbie Działań Zewnętrznych powstaje [grupa zadaniowa East StratCom](#).

79 %

Europejczyków obawia się wpływu dezinformacji na
wyborców

70 %

Europejczyków obawia się obcej ingerencji w wybory

NATO Glossaries

AAP-6 (2017)

NATO/PdP JAWNE





AAP-6
SŁOWNIK
TERMINÓW I DEFINICJI NATO

ZAWIERAJĄCY WOJSKOWE TERMINY I ICH DEFINICJE STOSOWANE W NATO

dezinformacja

Wszelkie przedsięwzięcia, mające na celu wprowadzenie przeciwnika w błąd poprzez manipulowanie, działania pozorujące i preparowanie dowodów, prowokujące działania szkodzące jego własnym interesom. 5/3/04

Perspectives and Approaches to Disinformation



Perspectives and Approaches to Disinformation

Economic Perspective

Media Perspective

Scientific Perspective

Political Perspective

Diplomatic Perspective

Military Perspective

Cybernetic Perspective

Psychological Perspective

Media Perspective

Disinformation today operates within the media and digital environment, while the Internet and social media enable the rapid and large-scale dissemination of manipulated content.

Disinformation may include completely false content, information taken out of context, as well as a combination of true and false information.

Media manipulation is based on the selective presentation of information, the fragmentation of messages, the omission of facts, and the creation of information chaos.

Political Perspective

Disinformation constitutes a tool for influencing political processes and the functioning of democracy.

The objective of such disinformation is to shape public opinion, reinforce specific ideological narratives, and influence citizens' electoral decisions.

Disinformation mechanisms contribute to social polarization, declining trust in public institutions, and the erosion of confidence in the media and political actors.

Economic Perspective

Disinformation affects not only society but also the economy and the information market.

False or manipulated content may influence the value of companies and stocks, investors' decisions, consumer behavior, and the level of trust in brands and institutions.

In the digital environment, disinformation can generate substantial profits at relatively low production and distribution costs, while also contributing to economic destabilization within a given region.

Scientific Perspective

Disinformation constitutes a subject of inquiry across numerous academic disciplines.

Research on disinformation focuses on the mechanisms of information influence, processes of manipulation and persuasion, the impact of emotions on content reception, as well as the functioning of the digital environment and algorithms.

The growing scale of the phenomenon makes disinformation one of the key research challenges of the information society.

Military Perspective

Disinformation is perceived as a component of operational activities and contemporary information conflicts.

From a military perspective, it constitutes a tool of influence employed against adversaries, societies, state institutions, and intelligence services.

Disinformation constitutes an important element of hybrid warfare, contemporary conflicts, and special operations.

Diplomatic Perspective

Disinformation constitutes a tool of influence in international relations.

It is employed to advance political interests, shape the image of states, reinforce specific international narratives, and influence public opinion abroad.

Contemporary disinformation campaigns have become an element of strategic competition among states within the information space.

Psychological Perspective

Disinformation influences cognitive processes and the ways in which recipients interpret reality.

It exploits psychological mechanisms related to emotions, stereotypes, prejudices, and the selective processing of information. Its objective is to shape perceptions of situations, social attitudes, and decision-making processes.

Content that is highly emotional, simplified, polarized, and tailored to specific target groups tends to be particularly effective.

Cybernetic Perspective

Disinformation functions as an element of dynamic processes occurring within the digital environment.


From a cybernetic perspective, particular importance is attached to information flows, digital platform algorithms, communication networks, and mechanisms for audience targeting.

Disinformation employs social engineering, propaganda, and information manipulation techniques.

Within the NATO framework, disinformation is regarded as a component of hybrid activities alongside cyberattacks, political pressure, and economic coercion.

Disinformation Through the Eyes of Poles (2024) Have You Ever Encountered Disinformation?


Czy kiedykolwiek spotkano się z dezinformacją?



https://www.lbm.uw.edu.pl/images/Dezinformacja_oczami_Polakw_edycja_2024.pdf

Have you ever encountered fake news?

Czy kiedykolwiek spotkano się z fake news?



0%
25%
50%
75%
100%



♀ 81%
♂ 86%



GenZ 85%
Boomer 83%



80%
89%




65%
87%

Where Do Poles Most Frequently Encounter False Information?

Gdzie Polacy spotkali się najczęściej z fałszywymi informacjami?


wyniki wśród Polaków, którzy mieli styczność z fake newsami



Telewizja, media społecznościowe i przekazy polityków – w tych miejscach Polacy najczęściej spotkali się z fake news


Typology of Disinformation

DEZINFORMACJA



Which Form of False Information Poses a Greater Threat?

Która forma fałszywej informacji niesie ze sobą większe zagrożenie?




Definition of Fake News

- a) a message containing disinformation content that is contextually linked to real events,
- b) intentionally created with the aim of misleading recipients or distorting their perception of reality,
- c) designed to provide tangible benefits to the sender or the distributing entity, including financial, reputational, or political gains.

Types of Fake News

Satire or Parody – the presentation of humorous yet false information in a manner that makes it appear to be true.




False Connection – the use of multimedia, headlines, and captions that bear no relation to the content being presented.

Types of Fake News

1 nauk oporecznych

Piotr Panasiuk ✓
@PanasukPetr

14 lipca we Francji kolejna rocznica zburzenia Bastylli. Do tego czasu rozruchy na pewno się jeszcze rozkręcą. Amerykańskie służby na pewno przygotowują coś gorącego dla Francuzów.
[#FranceRiots](#)



0:06 / 0:17

10:28 AM · 2 lip 2023 · 18,5 tys. Wyświetlenia

36 Tweetów podanych dalej · 2 Cytaty · 114 Polubień · 14 Zakładek


Types of Fake News

Misleading Content – a form of disinformation intended to persuade recipients to accept particular viewpoints and to evoke specific feelings and emotions.




Types of Fake News


False Context – the presentation of truthful information in a context entirely different from the one originally intended, thereby fundamentally altering its meaning.

 **Rebel06714** ✓
@Rebel06714

This is a video from 1990 where NATO promised russia it would not try to expand near any neighboring country. Russia told the US that was a redline. This is actual historic video from a press conference.

[Przetłumacz Tweeta](#)

 **Richard** ✓ @ricwe123 · 11 lip
This warmonger totally ignores the fact the West once made a promise.....
(Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General)



CONVERSATION RE
February 9, 1990 B1,
- 3:00 pm
Secretary Baker
President Gorbachev
Eduard Shevardnadze
s Baker, pagina 6.
and the need for assurances to t
we maintain a presence in a Ger
there would be no extension of
or forces of NATO one inch to th

12:47 AM · 16 lip 2023 · 48 Wyświetlenia

Types of Fake News

Impersonation of Genuine Sources – the substitution of authentic sources with false ones.

Informujemy o niezapłaconym mandacie karnym.
Dnia 12.04.2021 sprawa zostanie skierowana do sadu.
Kwota mandatowa:10,00 PLN
Oplata: <https://karnemandaty.net/>

Types of Fake News

Fabricated Content – a message that draws on real events but is deliberately created to mislead, shock, and provoke controversy. It may contain entirely false information, disputed facts, or manipulated quotations.



Types of Fake News

Manipulated Content – the exploitation of specific circumstances, the distortion or misrepresentation of facts, in order to substantiate particular claims or influence the opinions and behavior of others.



Types of Fake News

Fabricated Information – information that is entirely false from beginning to end and has been artificially created to evoke specific emotions.



Marcus
@_quoante



W tajemnicy przed opinią publiczną Ministerstwo Kultury i samorząd sfinansowali Centrum Kultury Żydowskiej w miejscowości Mogielnica. Ośrodek wyposażony jest w SPA, sale konferencyjne, jadalnie, boisko sportowe i pokoje gościnne. Z kieszeni podatnika na ten cel poszło 15 mln zł..




1:37 PM · 22 maj 2023 · 27,8 tys. Wyświetlenia

341 Tweetów podanych dalej 25 Cytatów 577 Polubień 21 Zakładek

The Scale of Disinformation

Number of Disinformation Cases in the EUvsDisinfo Database (2015–2026)

Liczba przypadków dezinformacji w bazie EUvsDisinfo (2015–2026)



Statistics

**9 out of 10 Poles believed
at least one of the false claims examined.
The survey assessed respondents' attitudes
towards 30 false claims related to energy, health,
climate, new technologies, and politics that had
circulated in the public sphere.**

Typical Respondent Profile

Gender: Male

Age: 55 years and older

**Place of residence: City with a population exceeding
500,000**

Education: Higher education

**These characteristics are associated with
individuals who are less likely to believe false
information.**

Dissemination of Disinformation Do Poles Receive Fake News from Other People?

Rozprzestrzenianie fałszywych informacji przez inne osoby

Czy Polacy otrzymują fake newsy od innych osób?

2021

67%

2024

70%



W jaki sposób Polacy otrzymują fałszywe informacje od innych osób?



Recognizing Fake News

CRAP [ad eng. *Currency, Relevance, Authority, Accuracy, Purpose*]

SCAM [ad eng. *Source, Content, Audience, Media, Effects*]

Feature	Questions
Currency (actuality of information)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When was the information published or last updated? • Has the information been corrected or updated? • Is the topic, to which the information refers, current or can it be applied to current events? • Is the information relevant to the topic?
Relevance (importance of information for the recipient)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the information helpful for your task or answering your question? • Who is the intended audience? • Is the information presented at an appropriate level for the recipient (i.e., is it neither too general nor too specialized, inadequate to the recipient's needs)? • Is the information objective and free from persuasion or bias? • Is the information the kind of information you expected to find?
Authority (credibility of information)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who is the author, publisher, source, sponsor of the information? • What are the author's or publisher's qualifications? What is their position or expertise? • Is the publishing source reliable and authoritative on this topic? • Has the information been reviewed or published? • Is the URL a commercial website, advertising site, or maintained by another entity (e.g., .com, .edu, .gov, .org, .net)?
Accuracy (reliability of information)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the information supported by evidence? • Can the information be verified? Is there a bibliography, references, notes? • Is the information consistent with other known information on the topic? • Does the language indicate bias or an attempt to influence the reader? • Are there spelling or grammar errors?
Purpose (purpose of information)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the purpose of the information (to inform, teach, sell, entertain, persuade)? • Is the information fact or opinion? • Are there any signs of intentional manipulation?

Recognizing Fake News

CRAP and SCAM

Feature	Questions
<p>Accuracy / Reliability of Information (CRAP – Accuracy)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Where does the information come from? • Is the information supported by evidence? • Is the information presented objectively? • Can it be verified? Are there data available in another source or based on personal opinion? • Is the language of the content free from emotional manipulation? • Are there spelling, grammatical or stylistic errors?
<p>Purpose of Information (SCAM – Purpose)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the purpose of creating the information? Is it to inform, educate, entertain, convince, scare or sell something? • Does the author/sponsor of the information clearly state their intentions or goals? • Is the information intended to manipulate the reader's opinion or behavior? • From whose perspective is the content presented? • Does the information focus on the needs of the political, ideological, cultural, religious agenda? Or does it represent the viewpoint of the institution or individuals?

8 STEPS

COUNCIL OF EUROPE RECOMMENDATIONS



COUNCIL OF EUROPE
CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

HOW TO RECOGNIZE FAKE NEWS



1 CHECK THE SOURCE

Check the website – information about the editorial team, mission, owner, financing sources and contact details.



2 CHECK THE AUTHOR

Verify whether the authors really exist. Check their competence and experience.



3 CHECK THE DATE

Assess whether the publication date is adequate and whether the content is current in relation to the factual context.



4 READ MORE

Do not limit yourself to headlines. Read the whole content and look for specific information.



5 USE ADDITIONAL SOURCES

Check information in other, reliable sources. Compare different points of view.



6 CHECK YOUR OWN BIASES

Be aware of your own views. Assess the content objectively and with an open mind.



7 CHECK, WHETHER IT IS A JOKE

Make sure whether the content is not intended as satire, parody or humour.



8 ASK THE EXPERTS

In case of doubts, consult experts or institutions dealing with information verification.

8 STEPS

COUNCIL OF EUROPE RECOMMENDATIONS



COUNCIL OF EUROPE
CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE

HOW TO RESPOND TO A "TROLL"



1 DON'T FEED THE TROLL

Trolls thrive on attention and reactions. Avoid engaging if possible.



2 ASSESS THE SITUATION

Determine whether it's really a troll or someone with a different opinion.



3 STAY CALM AND DON'T REACT EMOTIONALLY

Trolls try to provoke you. Stay calm and don't let them get to you.



4 RESPOND FACTUALLY AND BRIEFLY (IF YOU CHOOSE TO RESPOND)

Use facts, not emotions. Keep your response short and to the point.



5 DON'T TAKE IT PERSONALLY

Remember: it's not about you. Trolls often target randomly.



6 USE MODERATION TOOLS

Block, mute or report abusive users. Don't hesitate to use the tools available to you.



7 SUPPORT YOUR COMMUNITY

Engage with respectful people. A strong community is the best defense against trolls.



8 FOCUS ON POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE

Don't let trolls derail the conversation. Focus on meaningful discussions.

Study A – The Baltic Architecture of Disinformation

Disinformation, understood as an exceptionally complex method of operational activity, serving as a means of influencing a current or potential adversary, a hostile intelligence service, or specific social groups in another country, and at times also within one's own country, constitutes one of the key challenges facing contemporary information societies.

The study aims to present the EUvsDisinfo tool and to examine disinformation phenomena in countries that are culturally, geopolitically, and geographically close to one another.

Poles' Information Needs Regarding Disinformation

dezinformacja Wyszukiwane hasło


fake news Wyszukiwane hasło

propaganda Wyszukiwane hasło

Poland 2004 r. – dziś Wyszukiwarka Google

Zainteresowanie w ujęciu czasowym

Poland · 2004 r. – dziś



Średnie

zainteresowanie


Poland · 2004 r. – dziś



Answer The Public

AnswerThePublic is an online tool that visualizes questions, phrases, and associations entered by users into search engines, primarily Google.

In practice, the tool reveals how Internet users formulate their questions and express their information needs.



The Actual Information Needs of Poles

What does the word disinformation mean?

> What is the concept of disinformation?

How does disinformation work?

> How can you protect yourself from disinformation?

> How can you recognize that someone is manipulating you?

> How can you recognize deepfake videos?

What are the examples of the effects of disinformation?

> What are the consequences of disinformation?

> What are disinformation activities?

What are the techniques of disinformation?

> What is the name of the disinformation technique?

> What are the goals of disinformation?

> How can you deal with disinformation?

> How can you recognize that someone is manipulating you?

> What are the most common techniques of social manipulation?

The EUvsDisinfo Initiative

EUvsDisinfo is the European Union's flagship initiative, implemented by the East StratCom Task Force, a team of experts with backgrounds in communication, journalism, social sciences, and Russian studies.

The primary mission of the team is to counter disinformation through the identification of misleading content and sources, as well as their public disclosure in a dedicated database. The EUvsDisinfo database serves as both an educational and a research tool for information verification and the study of disinformation.

← Back to database

DISINFORMATION CASE DETAILS

Outlet: [am.sputniknews.ru](#) ([archived](#), [original](#))

Date of publication: [January 20, 2026](#)

Article language(s): [Russian](#)

Countries / regions discussed: [Moldova](#), [EU](#)

TAGS:

Sovereignty

European Union

Sergei Lavrov

Maia Sandu

DISINFO: The EU is interested in the complete destruction of Moldova's statehood

SUMMARY

The European Union is interested in the complete destruction of Moldova's statehood. This is evident in numerous facts. For example, the Moldovan language has been renamed Romanian, school textbooks teach Romanian history instead of Moldovan history and Nazi collaborators like Antonescu have been declared heroes.

RESPONSE

A pro-Kremlin disinformation narrative questioning [Moldova's integrity and sovereignty](#), falsely accusing the EU of attempting to destroy Moldova's statehood. The narrative aims to discredit [Moldova's European course](#).

Subject of the Study

The subject of the study comprised all disinformation cases documented in the EUvsDisinfo database concerning the Baltic States.

The cases were selected using database records retrieved through the application of the "Baltic States" geographical filter and the entire available chronological range.

The study employed the method of content analysis of database records, as well as qualitative and quantitative research methods, with particular emphasis on the analysis of content based on record metadata.

Why the Baltic States?

Membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Geopolitical proximity to Poland.


A comparable level of digital skills according to the Digital Skills & Jobs Platform report (Poland – 44.3% within the 16–74 age group).



52,9 %



45,3 %



62,6 %

Research Findings

Chronological scope: 29 October 2015 – 16 June 2025.

A total of 366 disinformation cases were identified (363 eligible for analysis).

Metadata examined: keywords (Tags), websites disseminating disinformation (Outlet), language(s) of content dissemination (Article language(s)), and countries appearing in the information narratives (Region/Country discussed).

Disinformation Cases Not Eligible for Further Analysis

Lp.	Tytuł artykułu w bazie danych	Data publikacji
1.	<i>In an interview taken by Kainius Radzebicius from the American...</i>	3 marca 2016 r.
2.	<i>Ukraine is an example on how to destroy a state without military action.</i>	23 września 2019 r.
3.	<i>NATO legalises piracy in the Baltic Sea.</i>	17 stycznia 2025 r.

Key Findings from the Keyword Analysis

Six Pillars of Disinformation

Pillar 1: Keywords associated with military and geopolitical issues.

Pillar 2: Narratives aimed at fostering a sense of grievance among Russian-speaking citizens of the Baltic States.

Pillar 3: Historical revisionism, primarily concerning the period of the Second World War.


Pillar 4: Narratives challenging the sovereignty and stability of the Baltic States.

Pillar 5: The conflict in Ukraine and its underlying causes.

Pillar 6: Conspiracy theories and meta-disinformation.

Analysis of Websites Disseminating Disinformation

The top six sources in the ranking account for more than 50% of all disinformation dissemination, while all websites listed in the table on the previous slide are responsible for 61.16% of all disinformation cases indexed in the database.



Wayback Machine

Wayback Machine is an online tool developed by the Internet Archive initiative that allows users to view how websites appeared in the past.

Internet Archive

**Archiving website
snapshots**

**Access to historical
versions of websites**


Applications

INTERNET ARCHIVE
WayBackMachine Explore more than 1 trillion [web pages](#) saved over time

DONATE

Calendar · Collections · Changes · Summary · Site Map · URLs

Saved **84 392** times between [March 2, 2001](#) and [March 14, 2026](#).



4

Sputnik БЕЛАРУСКАЯ КОМПАНИЯ

Услуги Туры Страны О нас Наши координаты English

Актуально **Услуги**

Еженедельно в Венгрии
Еженедельно в Прагу
Отдых в Беларуси
Горные лыжи в Чехии


Готовые и новые туры
Мы располагаем рядом **готовых программ** в различных странах мира, а также непрерывно занимаемся разработкой **новых**.

Мы располагаем рядом **групповых программ**. Мы организуем **индивидуальные туры** специально для Вас.

Заказ отеля
По заявке клиента, если он не приобрёл целую программу, и при организации индивидуального тура мы можем оказать помощь при заказе отеля в ряде стран.

Заказ билетов
Мы сотрудничаем с рядом агентств по **заказу билетов** и можем помочь Вам заказать билеты на самолёты, поезда и автобусы.

Визовая поддержка
Мы можем оказать Вам реальную помощь в **получении визы** в ряд стран, с которыми мы сотрудничаем.

src="http://akavita.kryvia.net/cgi-bin/tik76588&1920&32" width=88 height=31 border=0 alt="Akavita - the Belarusian tanker" data-bbox="258 718 360 755"/>


How Does It Help Us?

Reconstructing the “Life Cycle” of a Narrative

- a) When did a particular piece of content first appear?
- b) How was it modified over time?
- c) Was any content removed, altered, or softened?

Mapping Disinformation Networks

- a) Which websites were linked to one another?
- b) Which portals replicated the same content?
- c) What does the chain of disinformation look like?

Evidence in Analysis

- a) Preserving materials that may later disappear,
- b) Enabling researchers to cite specific versions of websites rather than their current state.

Context and Temporal Analysis

- a) Comparing content with political events, election campaigns, and crises (e.g., pandemics and wars).

Key Findings from the Source Analysis


- The strong presence of well-known Russian media brands (e.g., Sputnik and Russia Today in various domain versions and languages) suggests the existence of a strategic and coordinated disinformation network within the Baltic region.
- Frequent local "media branding" practices can be observed through the use of alternative domains or the addition of local extensions to original (.ru) domains.
- Due to their popularity, diverse content formats, and methods of content presentation, social media platforms dominate as tools of information manipulation.
- The considerable number of niche websites (111 domains appeared in only one or two disinformation cases) may indicate a strategy of "source dispersion."

Analysis of Countries Mentioned in Disinformation Narratives

363 cases = 37 countries/regions.

Lp.	Kraj/region	Liczba wskazań	Procentowy udział
1.	Rosja	220	60,61%
2.	Polska	123	33,89%
3.	Ukraina	115	31,68%
4.	Stany Zjednoczone	112	30,85%
5.	Białoruś	57	15,70%
6.	Unia Europejska	42	11,57%
7.	Niemcy	27	7,44%
8.	Wielka Brytania	19	5,24%
9.	Związek Radziecki	15	4,13%
10.	Rumunia	11	3,03%
11.	Szwecja	10	2,75%
12.	Gruzja	9	2,48%
13.	Francja	7	1,93%
14.	Finlandia	7	1,93%
15.	Czechy	6	1,65%

Analysis of Countries Mentioned in Disinformation Narratives – Narrative Contexts



Poland's Presence in Disinformation Narratives

Poland's significant presence stems primarily from its role in the region, its active support for Ukraine, its membership in NATO and the European Union, as well as its geographical proximity to both the Baltic States and Russia. Poland frequently appears in narratives aimed at undermining the country's stability, its international image, and its relations with neighboring states.

Summary of Study A

The analysis of 363 disinformation cases revealed six dominant thematic areas, with militaristic and geopolitical narratives playing a central role by portraying NATO as an aggressor and challenging its function as a guarantor of security in the Baltic region.

Poland is one of the key countries featured in disinformation narratives, serving as a NATO and EU ally, a logistical hub for the region, and a strategically sensitive geopolitical actor.

Disinformation sources form a coherent ecosystem consistent with the five pillars of Russian disinformation: official government communications, state-funded media, proxy sources, the weaponization of social media, and disinformation in cyberspace.

These narratives portray Poland as an initiator of escalating tensions, thereby contributing to the erosion of public trust, political polarization, and the weakening of the country's position in the international arena.


Study B – The Library as an Institution of Resilience

Recent years have been marked by social and geopolitical crises, ranging from the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine to disinformation crises, including those associated with artificial intelligence.

In response to these challenges, libraries, as local social institutions, have begun to assume new roles: educational, integrative, and socially stabilizing.

They are increasingly becoming participants in crisis communication and an important component in strengthening the resilience of local communities.

Zdzisław Arentowicz Municipal Public Library in Włocławek



**dziewięć filii
dwa oddziały biblioteczne
dwa punkty biblioteczne**



5400



824



911



53

Subject of the Study

The subject of the study comprised posts documented on the website of the Zdzisław Arentowicz Municipal Public Library in Włocławek, published under the "News" section.

The materials were selected according to predefined time frames corresponding to periods of heightened public interest in two major crisis situations: the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian military aggression against Ukraine.



Zmiana funkcjonowania filii i działów bibliotecznych

28 października 2020 Martyna Dębczyńska



Pierwsze książki w języku ukraińskim!

18 marca 2022 Katarzyna Fronczak



Pierwsze książki w języku ukraińskim są już dostępne w Filii nr 11 przy ul. Łęskiej 28 ! Wkrótce pojawią się kolejne, a tymczasem zapraszamy do katalogu i biblioteki <https://tiny.pl/9n123>

Aktualności literatura w języku ukraińskim

Biblioteka na rzecz uchodźców

22 marca 2022 Martyna Dębczyńska



Miejska Biblioteka Publiczna im. Zdzisława Arentowicza włącza się w działania wrocławskiego samorządu na rzecz uchodźców z Ukrainy przebywających we Wrocławku. W budynku przy ul. Żytniej pojawił się ufundowany przez bibliotekę regał z nowościami książkowymi w... [Czytaj Dalej Biblioteka na rzecz uchodźców](#)

#literaturaworyginale #literaturapoukraińsku #nowewkatalogu #nowewbibliotece
#bibliotekapomaga #wolność #ilovebiblioteka #bibliotekajestsuper #lubimyczytać
#biblioterapia #bajkoterapia #solidarnizukrainą

Subject of the Study

The study was based on a content analysis of 347 messages published on the library's website under the "News" section during the following periods:

1 March 2020 – 1 June 2021 (197 messages)

24 February 2022 – 24 August 2022 (150 messages)

During the content analysis, each message was coded and classified according to its message type, message function, and message tone.

Message Type

Refers to the dominant nature of the message, determined by its primary substantive content and narrative form.

"What is the message about?"

EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIAL
PROMOTIONAL SERVICE-ORIENTED
IMAGE-BUILDING INFORMATIONAL

Message Function

Refers to the primary purpose that a message serves for its audience and the communication community.
“Why was this message published?”

ADAPTIVE

IMAGE-BUILDING

PROMOTIONAL

INTEGRATIVE

EDUCATIONAL

EVALUATIVE

REGULATORY


Message Tone

Refers to the emotional and stylistic character of a message, reflected in the manner in which content is presented and communicated to recipients.

“How is the message communicated?”

COMMUNITY-ORIENTED MOBILIZING REFLECTIVE
NEUTRAL REASSURING
PROMOTIONAL NOSTALGIC

Number of Messages Published in 2018–2025



Communication During the COVID-19 Pandemic (Situation A)

Communication During the COVID-19 Pandemic (Situation A)

Chronological scope: 1 March 2020 – 1 June 2021.

Number of records analyzed: 197.

**Data examined: message titles, metadata (tags), and
the content of news items.**

Message type (Situation A)

No.	Message Type	Number of Occurrences	Percentage Share
1.	Educational	72	36.54 %
2.	Organizational	37	18.78 %
3.	Social	31	15.74 %
4.	Promotional	30	15.23 %
5.	Service-related	13	6.60 %
6.	Informational	8	4.06 %
7.	Image-building	6	3.05 %

n=197

Message Function (Situation A)

No.	Message Function	Number of Occurrences	Percentage Share
1.	Adaptive	62	31.47 %
2.	Integrative	52	26.40 %
3.	Regulatory	32	16.24 %
4.	Image-building	24	12.18 %
5.	Educational	21	10.66 %
6.	Promotional	4	2.03 %
7.	Evaluative	2	1.02 %

n=197

Message Tone (Situation A)

No.	Message Tone	Number of Occurrences	Percentage Share
1.	Community-oriented	62	31.47 %
2.	Mobilizing	52	26.50 %
3.	Reflective	25	12.69 %
4.	Neutral	25	12.69 %
5.	Reassuring	18	9.14 %
6.	Promotional	8	4.06 %
7.	Nostalgic	7	3.45 %

n=197

Key Findings (Situation A)

The analysis of 197 messages published during the pandemic revealed that educational communication was the dominant form of interaction between the library and its users (36.54%), indicating that the library quickly shifted from informing about restrictions to sustaining participation in cultural life.

The substantial share of the integrative function (26.40%) indicates a deliberate effort to maintain relationships with the local community despite social isolation, particularly with older adults.

At the functional level, adaptation was the most prominent function (31.47%), reflecting the reorganization of services and efforts to familiarize users with new rules governing library use.

The dominant message tones—community-oriented (31.47%) and mobilizing (26.50%)—reinforced a sense of continuity in the social and cultural life of Włocławek residents.

The library served as an informational, organizational, and emotional stabilizer.

Communication During the Russian Military Aggression Against Ukraine (Situation B)

Chronological scope: 24 February 2022 – 24 August 2022.

Number of records analyzed: 150.

Data examined: message titles, metadata (tags), and the content of news items.

Message Type (Situation B)

No.	Message Type	Number of Occurrences	Percentage Share
1.	Educational	55	36.67 %
2.	Promotional	24	16.00 %
3.	Social	19	12.67 %
4.	Service-related	18	12.00 %
5.	Organizational	13	8.67 %
6.	Image-building	11	7.33 %
7.	Informational	10	6.66 %

n=150

Message Type (Situation B)

No.	Message Function	Number of Occurrences	Percentage Share
1.	Educational	60	40.00 %
2.	Integrative	24	16.00 %
3.	Promotional	21	14.00 %
4.	Adaptive	18	12.00 %
5.	Regulatory	15	10.00 %
6.	Image-building	8	5.33 %
7.	Evaluative	4	2.67 %

n=150

Message Type (Situation B)

No.	Message Tone	Number of Occurrences	Percentage Share
1.	Community-oriented	50	33.33 %
2.	Reflective	28	18.67 %
3.	Nostalgic	26	17.33 %
4.	Neutral	17	11.33 %
5.	Promotional	13	8.67 %
6.	Mobilizing	10	6.67 %
7.	Reassuring	6	4.00 %

n=150

Key Findings (Situation B)

The analysis of 150 messages published during the six months following the Russian military aggression against Ukraine identified educational communication as the dominant message type (36.67%). However, compared with the COVID-19 period, promotional and service-oriented content played a more prominent role.

The substantial share of integrative and promotional functions (30% combined) reflects the mobilization of the local community around initiatives aimed at supporting refugees.

The primary function of communication was educational (40%), focusing on the interpretation of the war, historical memory, and social solidarity.

At the level of message tone, alongside community orientation, reflection and nostalgia also featured prominently (36% combined), reflecting Polish historical memory, collective experiences, and the legacy of war.

The library became a local center of solidarity, remembrance, and support for refugees.

Summary

The comparison of the two crisis situations demonstrates that the Włocławek Public Library does not respond in a standardized manner but rather adapts its communicative functions flexibly to the nature of the threat.

In both cases, educational and community-oriented communication predominated, confirming a lasting institutional shift toward fostering social resilience.

The Municipal Public Library in Włocławek not only responds to crises but also actively contributes to strengthening the resilience of the city and its citizens.



Dziękuję za uwagę i zapraszam do kontaktu!

**Thank you for your attention and I look forward to hearing
from you!**